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This study investigates post privatisation operating and financial performance of 
newly privatised firms in Pakistan. The sample consists of fifteen firms privatised in 
the period 2002 - 2008. Operating performance of newly privatised firms in this study 
is measured over a four year period including the year of privatisation. The three 
years trend of post privatisation operating performance is compared to operating 
performance in the year of privatisation. Financial performance is measured using 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR). Results of the study show that post 
privatisation, profitability, efficiency and pay out increases, while leverage decreases 
for more than 50% of the sample firms. The results also indicate that firms privatised 
through different methods of privatisation show different trends in post privatisation 
operating performance. Findings regarding the post privatisation financial 
performance show that BHAR are negative for all of the sample firms over the three 
years horizon, while different methods used to privatise state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) does not affect post privatisation BHARs of newly privatised firms.
4
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1 Aims and Objectives
1.1 Introduction
This chapter serves as an introduction to the dissertation. The chapter will present the 
focus of the research and will identify aims of the research as well. In the end research 
questions of the study will be outlined and the rationale behind these research 
questions will also be discussed. The chapter is divided into four sub sections to cover 
these topics. Each of these topics is discussed in the following sections.
1.2 Focus
Privatisation is the focus of this study. The term privatisation can be used in a number 
of ways to define the relationship between government and private sector (Kay & 
Thompson (1986). Kay & Thompson (1986.p. 18) further states that “among the most 
important of these relationships are denationalisation (the sale of publicly owned 
assets), deregulation (the introduction of competition into statutory monopolies) and 
contracting out (the franchising to private firms of the production of state financed 
goods and services)”. One of the rationales behind privatisation is to increase 
efficiency of state owned enterprises (SOEs) (Cavaliere and Scabrosetti, 2008). 
Similarly Megginson and Netter (2001) survey the literature on efficiency after 
privatisation and conclude that privately owned firms are more efficient than their 
comparable SOEs counterparts.
Reasons behind the improved efficiency in post privatisation operating and financial 
performance can be explained with the help of property rights theory (Alchian, 1965) 
and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One of the focuses of property 
rights theory is that owners of firms are able to sell their ownership rights in the
5
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market if they are not satisfied with the managerial and firm performance (Vickers 
and Yarrow, 1988). Owners in privatised firms can easily sell their ownership in 
capital markets as opposed to state owned enterprises (SOEs), in which ownership lies 
with governments and can not be sold in markets. Therefore the existence of a market 
for ownership rights puts more pressure on managers and provides more incentives 
for performance improvement in privatised firms.
The focus of agency theory is that managers (agents) in both private and SOEs are 
assumed to maximise their own benefits rather than maximising wealth of the owners 
(principals) of organisations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The principal agent 
relationship in SOEs is more complex, because there are two layers of agency 
relationship in SOEs. One layer is between public-to-politicians and the second is 
between politicians-to-managers. This extra layer of agency relationship effectively 
reduces the incentives for monitoring managers’ behaviour and leads to inefficiency 
in SOEs. On the other hand privatisation induces changes to corporate governance 
and managerial incentives, which leads to improved performance (Cuervo & 
Villalonga, 2000).
Similarly the proponents of public choice view argue that politicians and bureaucrats 
pursue their own objectives rather than public interest (ultimate owners of SOEs), so 
they impose goals on SOEs (such as, maximise employment, promote regional 
development etc) that can lead them to gain but can conflict with profit maximisation 
and might lead to value destruction (Boubakri et al, 2004).
As all of the theories mentioned above suggest that privatised firms are considered to 
be more efficient and profitable than SOEs, therefore one would expect improvement 
in the post privatisation performance of SOEs. This has led to testing of hypothesis 
about relatively more efficient private sector performance that is reviewed later.
6
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Drawing on the above theories this study contributes to a body of empirical literature 
that investigates the relationship between ownership and firm performance by 
analysing the post privatisation performance of companies in Pakistan.
1.3 Aims
Privatisation is carried out in a number of different ways in different parts of the 
world, depending on the objectives of the government involved, state of the economy 
and size of the SOEs. Brada (1996) discusses different methods of privatisation and 
states that privatisation through the sale of state property can be carried out in two 
ways. One is direct sale (or asset sale) of state owned enterprises in one transaction or 
in many transactions in tranches, and the second is share issue privatisation (SIP) in 
which some or all of the government’s ownership of SOEs is sold to investors through 
a public share offerings. Privatisation in Pakistan is carried out using both direct sale 
and SIP.
Agency, property rights and public choice theories discussed in the earlier section 
above suggest that privatised firms are more profitable than SOEs. The post 
privatisation efficiency argument of these theories and the privatisation programme 
carried out in Pakistan has created an opportunity to investigate the post privatisation 
efficiency phenomenon in the context of Pakistan. Therefore, first aim of this research 
is to study post privatisation operating performance of state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
that were privatised either through direct sale or SIP. Second aim of the research is to 
study the long-run (3-years) stock returns of newly privatised firms; again this 




The research questions of this study are:
© Has the operating performance of SOEs improved in the three years following
privatisation in Pakistan?
® Is there any difference in the post privatisation operating performance of
newly privatised firms that were privatised through direct sale and share issue 
privatisation (SIP)?
© What are the stock returns to investors of newly privatised firms over the long-
run (3-years) after privatisation, for firms that were privatised through direct 
sale and SIP?
© Is there any difference in the stock return of firms privatised through direct
sale and SIP?
1.5 Rationale for the research questions
The existing literature on privatisation both in developed and developing countries 
have documented improved operating performance after privatisation of SOEs (e.g. 
Megginson et al (1994), D’souza and Megginson (1999), Boubakri et al (2005) etc) . 
Similarly the existing literature on post privatisation long-run stock returns also shows 
increase in stock returns (e.g. Menyah et al (1995), Jelic and Briston (2003), Choi and 
Nam (2006) etc). The first rationale behind the research questions is that, there is no 
study which investigates these issues in the context of Pakistani privatisation 
programme so this research is an attempt to fill this gape.
The second rationale behind the research questions is that most of the existing 
literature has studied only SIP which is a common method of privatisation around the 
world. But it is different in the case of Pakistan where most of privatisation
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transactions are carried out through direct sale (or asset sale). Therefore, it is 
important to investigate whether or not operating and financial performance of newly 
privatised firms is affected by the method of privatisation used.
The third rationale behind the research questions is that the existing studies on 
privatisation have investigated the operating and financial performance separately. 
This research will investigate operating performance and stock returns at the same 





Since the 1970s, following the UK and the US experiences, both developed and 
developing countries have accelerated the privatisation of traditional public industries, 
such as electricity, telecommunications, railways and water supply. Privatisation 
particularly gained momentum in the late 1980s and spread to a wide range of 
developing countries. Over the last two decades significant proportion of privatisation 
transactions have been in developing economies and have resulted in the sale of 
public utilities. Megginson et al (1994, p.421) states that some of the major goals of 
governments to privatise state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are to“(l) increase firms’ 
profitability (2) increase its operating efficiency (3) cause (or allow) firms to increase 
its capital investment spending; and (4) to increase its output”. It is the first and 
second objectives mentioned by Megginson et al (1994) above which is the topic of 
investigation for many studies on privatisation and will be investigated in this study as 
well in the context of Pakistan.
The existing literature on privatisation mainly covers two aspects of privatisation i.e. 
post privatisation operating and financial performance of newly privatised firms and 
the long run stock returns of privatisation initial public offerings (EPOs). For example 
((Boardman and Vining (1989), Megginson et al (1994), Boubakri and Cosset 
(1998),D’souza and Megginson (1999),Dewenter and Malatesta (2000), Martin and 
Parker (1995), Gupta (2005) etc) analyse the operating and financial performance of 
privatised firms. While ((Megginson et al (2000), Boardman and laurin (2000), Choi 




In global terms, Pakistan has been a relative latecomer with regard to adopting 
privatisation policies but in recent years a number of SOEs have been transferred to 
private ownership. When considered in connection with the liberalisation of markets 
such as energy, telecommunications and banking, privatisation has had a marked 
impact on the composition of the Pakistani public enterprise sector as well as the 
structure of important markets. It has also had significant effects in terms of corporate 
performance, employment and equity markets. Privatisation efforts began in Pakistan 
after the creation of Privatisation Commission (PC) on January 22, 1991. Although 
the PC mandate initially restricted to industrial companies, by 1993 it had expanded to 
also include Power, Oil & Gas, Transport (aviation, railways, ports and shipping), 
Telecommunications and Banking and Insurance. According to the data published by 
PC, during the period 1991 to 2009 the Commission completed privatisation of 167 
transactions in the country.
Based on the existing literature on privatisation one focus of this study would be to 
analyse the post privatisation operating performance of newly privatised firms in 
Pakistan. The existing literature mainly investigate the performance of privatised 
firms which were privatised through share issue privatisation (SIP), as this is the most 
common method of privatisation around the world. However, this study includes 
firms which are privatised through direct sale as well, because most of the 
privatisation transactions in Pakistan are carried out through assets sale (direct sale) to 
other companies.
The second focus of this study would be to investigate the long run stock returns to 
investors of newly privatised companies. Again this analysis will include firms that 
were privatised through SIP as well as those firms that were privatised through direct
11
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sale. Again this is different from the existing literature which only covers the long-run 
stock performance of firms privatised through share issue privatisation.
2.2 Long run returns to investors in share issue privatisation
Various studies have analysed the long run (1-5 year) performance of privatisation 
Initial Public Offers (PIPOs). Some of these studies are single country while others 
analysed multi national samples for the long run performance of privatisation IPOs. 
Levis (1993) studied the long run returns to 806 British IPOs from 1980 to 1988. In 
Levis’s sample of 806 IPOs only 12 were privatisation initial public offers (PIPOs) 
which accounted for 76% of the total IPOs value. The main findings of the study 
showed a complete contrast in the long run performance of private sector IPOs and 
PIPOs, private sector IPOs under-performed the market by more than 10% over three 
years while PIPOs out-performed the market by over 15%. Similarly Menyah et al 
(1995) studied the long-run performance of 40 British privatisation IPOs during the 
period 1981-1991 and found that the UK PIPOs provide long-run holding gains to 
investors.
The long-run returns of PIPOs has also been studied in countries other than the UK 
and the same pattern .of positive long-run return has been reported by many studies. 
For example Jelic and Briston (1999) investigate the initial and long-run returns for 
25 PEPO and 24 other IPOs in Hungary during 1990-1998 and report that PIPOs 
produce positive market-adjusted returns over 1, 2, and 3-year holding periods. 
Similarly Jelic and Briston (2003) examine initial and long-run returns for 55 PIPOs 
and 110 other IPOs in Poland during 1990-1998 and found that PIPOs investors earn 
significantly positive 1, 3 and 5-year market adjusted returns, while other IPOs earn 
negative returns. The pattern of positive long-run returns seems to persist outside the 
European countries as well, Paudyal et al (1998) examine the long-run returns to
12
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investors in 18 PIP Os in Malaysia from 1984-1995 and show that PIPOs yield normal 
returns over 1, 3 and 5-year holding periods.
The long-run stock returns of PIPOs for multi national samples also show the same 
pattern of positive long-run returns. Megginson et al (2000) investigate the long-run 
buy and hold returns for 158 firms in 33 countries from (1981-1997) and show that 
share issue privatisation investors earn higher returns than the investors who invest in 
either of the local , world , USA market or industry matched firms. Choi and Nam 
(2006) calculate one, three and five years buy and hold returns based on monthly data 
for 241 firms in 41 countries and show that privatisation IPOs out perform their 
domestic market over a five-year holding period. However, Choi and Nam (2006) 
argue that by value weighing the returns the measured abnormal performance reduce 
to an insignificant economic level. In another similar study carried out by Nam et al 
(2006) in which they studied 241 firms in 42 countries from 1981-2003 and reported 
the same findings that PIPOs out perform their domestic stock markets in the long- 
run. However, they did not show any significant abnormal long-run stock 
performance relative to their size and size-and-book matched firms of respective 
countries.
On the basis of efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970), shares of newly privatised 
companies should reflect all available information about the newly privatised 
company and PIPOs should earn normal returns. But Perotti (1995) provides 
explanation for the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) of PIPOs. Perotti (1995) 
argue that there is additional risk related to policy and economic uncertainty in PIPOs, 
and this additional risk might cause significantly positive abnormal returns during the 
first few years after privatisation.
13
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Measuring the long-run stock returns is one of the most disputed topics in the finance 
literature and there is no universally agreed method for the measurement of long-run 
stock returns (Choi and Nam, 2006). Similarly Barber and Lyon (1997) highlight this 
problem as well and argue that the long-run abnormal returns some times produce 
misspecified test statistics. As mentioned by . (Choi and Nam, .2006) cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) and Buy and Hold Abnormal returns (BHAR) are the most 
widely used methods for the measurement of long-run stock returns. CAR is used to 
measure daily stock returns while BHAR is used to measure buy and hold returns over 
a longer period of time.
One of the questions this research is trying to answer is that, what are the stock 
returns to investors of newly privatised companies over the long-run (3-years) after 
privatisation? To answer this question the most common model used in the existing 
literature is the buy-and- hold abnormal returns (BHAR). So in this study the 
methodology used by (Choi and Nam, 2006) will be adopted to measure BHAR over 
a three year period for privatised firms.
BHARit =  p j  (1+Rit) - f l  (1 + R mct) (1)
/=0 t=0
Where, t  is the number of months from the first trading day; t is the period of 
investment in months ( r  = 12, 24, 36); Rit is the return on security i in month t, and 
R m ct is the market return in month t.
This study will add to the existing literature by analysing the long-run stock 
performance of PIP Os in the context of a developing country (Pakistan) and will 
investigate whether PIPOs in the case of Pakistan show the same pattern of long-run 
performance as documented by earlier studies in developed and other developing 
countries. At the same time the study will also investigate the long-run returns of 
firms privatised through asset sale which has not been studied before. To the best of
14
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our knowledge there is no such study carried out until now on Pakistani privatisation, 
so this study is an attempt to fill this gap in the existing literature.
2.3 Operating performance of privatised firms
The second aspect of privatisation which is of interest in this study is the post 
privatisation operating performance of privatised firms. Numerous studies have 
investigated the issue both in developed and developing countries and in single and 
multinational contexts. Most studies surveyed by Megginson and Netter (2001) and 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) report significant increase in post-privatisation, 
efficiency, profitability and labour productivity. However quite a few studies 
document a poor post privatisation operating performance. (See for example, Jain and 
Kini (1994), Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997), Echbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) 
etc.
Martin and Parker (1995) used two measures (rate of return on capital employed and 
annual growth in value-added per employee-hour) as indicators of improved 
performance and examine 11 British firms privatised during 1981-88 in five periods, 
nationalized, pre-privatisation, after announcement of privatisation, post privatisation 
and in the recession of the early 1990s. Martin and Parker (1995) report mixed results 
and argue that less than half of the 11 firms studied showed significant improvement 
in performance, while several firms’ performance improved prior to privatisation 
which they called as an indication of initial “shake-out” effect upon privatisation 
announcement.
As far as the empirical evidence in multinational context is concerned the results are 
more consistent and almost all of the studies show improved operating performance 
after privatisation. Megginson et al (1994) studies 61 companies from 18 countries 
and 32 industries that experience either full or partial privatisation during the period
15
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1961 to 1990. Megginson et al (1994) argue that after privatisation the privatised 
firms showed increase in sales, their profitability increased as well as their capital 
investment spending also increased. Similarly D’souza and Megginson (1999) 
document an increase in , profitability, real sales, operating efficiency and dividend 
payments, while leverage ratios decreased significantly after privatisation in 85 
companies in 13 developing and 15 industrialised countries.
Boubakri and Cosset (1998) studied 79 companies from 21 developing countries with 
either full or partial privatisation between 1980-1992 and report a significant increase 
both for unadjusted and market adjusted, profitability, operating efficiency, capital 
investment spending, output, employment level and dividend pay out. They also 
document a significant decline only for adjusted leverage ratio and not for unadjusted 
leverage ratio. More recently Boubakri et al (2005) studied the post privatisation 
performance of 230 firms in 32 developing countries and document a significant 
increase in post privatisation profitability, efficiency, investment and output 
consistent with earlier studies.
The pattern of improved operating performance in developed countries is consistent 
with that of developing countries, as D’souza et al (2005) investigate 23 developed 
(OECD) countries and document a significant increase in profitability, efficiency, 
output and capital expenditure after privatisation as reported in earlier studies for 
developing countries.
As the existing literature shows that the operating performance of companies 
improves significantly after privatisation both in developed and developing countries. 
This study is an attempt to investigate whether or not the performance of newly 
privatised firms in Pakistan improves after privatisation. Using the methodology 
adopted by Megginson et al (1994) the post privatisation performance of companies in
16
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this study will be measured in terms of profitability, operating efficiency, leverage 
and output.
Profitability will be measured in terms of Return on sales, return on capital employed 
(ROCE) and return on equity as used by Megginson et al (1994), while operating 
efficiency will be measured in terms of total asset turn over (sale/total assets). 
Leverage will be measured in terms of long term debt to equity and payout will be 
measured in terms of dividend payout (Megginson et al, 1994).
2.4 Summary
The literature review in the previous sections examined the existing literature on 
privatisation and the theoretical background of post privatisation operating and 
financial performance improvements. The literature also shows that the two aspects of 
privatisation studied extensively in the existing literature are (1) post privatisation 
operating performance of privatised firms and (2) the long-run stock returns to 
investors of newly privatised firms. The review also show that both these aspects of 
privatisation have been studied in firms that were privatised through share issue 
privatisation only, and a study on the analysis of post privatisation operating and 
financial performance of firms privatised through direct/asset sale is missing in the 
existing literature.
In the review it was noted that operating and financial performance of newly 
privatised SOEs improve after privatisation, which may be considered as validation 
of agency and property rights theories which argue that the introduction of new 
external and internal mechanisms can be expected to reduce agency problems and 
improve the performance of privatised firms. The empirical studies discussed in the 
review also show that privatisation lead to improved operating and financial 
performance of SOEs both in developed and developing countries but no studies were
17
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found that investigated this phenomenon in the context of Pakistan. Therefore, this 
study will investigate post privatisation operating and financial performance of SOEs 
in the context of Pakistan. The study asks the following research questions. Has the 
operating performance of SOEs improved in the three years following privatisation in 
Pakistan? How do the stocks of newly privatised firms (both SIP and asset sale 
privatisation) perform in the long-run? In the following section choice of appropriate 
methods to answer these questions is discussed.
18
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3 Methods of Data collection
3.1 Introduction
The two main philosophical traditions in business and management research are 
positivism and social constructionism. One of the key differences between the two 
traditions is that, how they view the social world. Positivism assumes that the social 
world exists externally and its properties should be measured through objective 
methods, while the key idea of social constructionism is that social world is not 
external and ‘reality’ is socially constructed and given meaning by people (Easterby- 
Smith et al,2002).
These two different philosophical traditions lead to different research questions and 
research methodologies, as (Crotty, 1998) states that, epistemologies, theoretical 
perspectives, research questions, methods of data collection and research designs are 
all interrelated and inform one another. It is clear from Crotty’s (1998) argument that 
the type of research questions influences a certain type of methodology being adopted 
for answering the research questions. This suggests that some methodologies for 
answering certain type of research questions would be considered more appropriate 
than the other available methodologies.
As stated in the earlier sections the research questions of this study are as follows, has 
the operating performance of SOEs improved in the three years following 
privatisation in Pakistan? Is there any difference in the post privatisation operating 
performance of newly privatised firms that were privatised through direct sale and 
share issue privatisation (SIP)? What are the stock returns to investors of newly 
privatised firms over the long-run (3-years) after privatisation, for firms that were
19
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privatised through direct sale and SIP? And is there any difference in the stock return 
of firms privatised through direct sale and SIP?
One property which is common in all of the research questions stated above is that, all 
these questions require measurement of economic performance of firms. Such 
economic performance at firm level is reflected in operating and financial indicators 
which are the accounting and finance based parameters such as accounting ratios and 
share price changes. The nature of these observable data makes the positivist 
approach and quantitative methods more appropriate to answer these research 
questions, rather than adopting a social constructionist approach and qualitative 
methods, such as interviews and focus groups (managers or shareholders), 
observations (participants or nonparticipant) etc. This study therefore, taking a 
conventional economic analysis framework to analyse corporate performance, relies 
on historical financial and accounting data, and applies positivist methodologies.
In this chapter data used in the research, data collection methods and research design 
adopted for this research will be discussed in detail. In the following sections each of 
these topics will be discussed in the context of this study.
3.2 Data
As Crotty (1998) states that positivist researches mainly rely on statistical analysis, 
sampling, measurement and scaling to answer research questions. Also the aims of the 
research discussed earlier are to investigate post privatisation operating and financial 
performance of newly privatised SOEs in Pakistan. So it is clear that we need numeric 
data to answer the research questions stated earlier. In the case of this research the 




As published by the Privatisation commission of Pakistan a total of 167 privatisation 
transactions were completed until February, 2009, since the privatisation programme 
started in 1991. Out of the total of 167 privatisation transactions that were carried out 
in Pakistan, 67 (40%) transactions took place after the year 1999, but due to the 
unavailability of financial data for transactions carried out before 1999, only those 
transactions that took place in the period 1999 to 2009 will be analysed. Total of 15 
newly privatised companies are included in the sample which includes 9 IPO 
privatisation transactions and 6 direct sale privatisation transactions. Non-probability 
sampling (Blaxter et al, 2006) is used and only those companies were included in the 
sample which have their accounting and financial data available in the public domain. 
This unavailability of data for the whole privatisation transactions that took place after 
1999 has affected the sample size and undermined generalisiblity of the research to 
the whole population, which can be considered as a weakness of the study.
3.3 Data collection methods
Data for this research was mainly collected through the use of internet. There are 
three main reasons behind using this method of data collection, (1) required data was 
available in public domain through internet (2) easy access and cost effectiveness (3) 
time saving. Data for the research was collected from the following sources. Data 
about the number of privatisation transactions, the date of privatisation of each 
company, the percentage of share holdings sold by the government and the method 
(asset sale or SIP) through which privatisation took place was collected from the 
website of privatisation commission of Pakistan.
Accounting data was collected from the annual reports of privatised companies. These 
annual reports were either downloaded from companies’ websites or from 
www.paksearch.com (a data base which contains annual reports for companies in
21
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Pakistan) depending on their availability in either of these sources. Stock prices data 
and market index return data was collected from the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) 
website which is also available in public domain.
3.4 Research Methodology
The main research questions this study is trying to answer are (1) did the operating 
performance of newly privatised companies improve over the long-run (3-years) after 
privatisation? (2) What are the stock returns to investors of newly privatised 
companies over the long-run (3-years) after privatisation? The methodologies 
adopted to answer both these questions are discussed in the following sections.
3.4.1 Operating performance measures
To answer the first question the post privatisation operating performance of firms will 
be measured over the three years after privatisation. Megginson et al (1994) used 
profitability, operating efficiency, leverage and payout to measure the operating 
performance of privatised firms. The three years period is used instead of 5-years or 
more, because some of the transaction took place more recently and data for more 
than three years could not be collected for these transactions. To measure the 
operating performance of privatised firms in this research the methodology used by 
Megginson et al (1994) will be adopted. However the methodology adopted in this 
research differs slightly from that used by Megginson et al (1994). The first difference 
is in the use of profitability ratios. Return on capital employed (ROCE) will be used 
instead of returns on assets used by Megginson et al (1994) in addition to net profit 
margins and return on equity to measure profitability. The reasons for using ROCE 
instead of return on assets are that ROCE is more widely used and is considered to be 
more comprehensive and accurate measure of a firm’s profitability as compared to
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return on assets (Britton and Waterston, 2003). This will add to the credibility of the 
results.
The second difference is that the ratios used to measure operating efficiency are 
different from those used by Megginson et al (1994). Sale efficiency (real 
sale/employees) and net income effi ciency (net income/employees) are used by 
Megginson et al (1994) to measure operating efficiency, but due to the unavailability 
of data on the number of employees it was not possible to use these ratios as measures 
of operating efficiency. Instead total asset turn over (sale/total assets) is used to 
measure operating efficiency. Leverage and payout , are measured in the same way as 
measured by Megginson et al (1994).
Following is the list of ratios used to measure operating performance of privatised 
firms.
Ratios used to measure Profitability:
® Net profit margin = profit after tax/sales
® Return on capital employed = profit before interest and tax/capital employed 
® Return on equity = profit after tax/equity 
Ratios used to measure operating efficiency 
• Total assets turnover = sales/total assets 
Ratio used to measure leverage
® Debt to equity = long term debt/equity 
Ratio used to measure pay out
® Dividend pay out = dividend/ profit after tax
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3.4.2 Stock returns measures
The second question this research is trying to answer is that, what are the stock returns 
to investors of newly privatised companies over the long-run (3-years) after 
privatisation? To answer this question the most common model used in the existing 
literature is the buy-and- hold abnormal returns (BHAR). BHAR model used by Choi 
and Nam (2006) is adopted in this research. Buy-and- hold abnormal returns (BHAR) 
are calculated as follows:
BH ARit= f[ (1+Rit) - f[ (1 +R m ct) (1)
t=0 f=0
Where, t is the number of months from the first trading day after issue; r is the period 
of investment in months ( r  = 12, 24, 36); Rit is the return on security i in month t, and 
R mct is the market return in month t.
Monthly buy-and-hold returns (BHR) will be calculated first for the calculation of 
BHAR. Monthly BHR is calculated by compounding daily returns, and then annual 
BHR is calculated by compounding monthly BHR over 12 months.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter outlined epistemological background of the research, data used in the 
research, sources of data and methodology of the research. It was mentioned that in 
line with the existing literature positivist epistemology is adopted to answer the 
research questions. This positivist epistemology has influenced the choice of data, 
methods of data collection and methodology of the research. Numerical data and 
statistical methods are used to answer the research questions. Specifically 
methodologies adopted by Megginson et al (1994) and Choi and Nam (2006) are used 
in the research. Using the methods discussed here, in the next chapter data analysis 
will be discussed in detail.
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4 Collecting and analysing the data
In the previous chapter a brief discussion of data used for the research was given. As a 
continuation to the last chapter this chapter will provide a detailed description of how 
data for the study was collected and then how this data was analysed to study the post 
privatisation operating and financial performance of newly privatised SOEs.
4.1 Data collection
This section describes how the newly privatised companies in Pakistan were chosen to 
be included in the sample and how the data was collected to measure the operating 
performance as well as the financial performance of newly privatised companies.
4.1.1 How the sample was chosen
The sample consists of fifteen newly privatised companies privatised in the period 
2000- 2009. The companies were chosen irrespective of the industry they were 
operating and the method of privatisation used for their privatisation. The major factor 
for a company to be included in the sample was the availability of accounting and 
financial data after privatisation. This factor has affected, size of the sample used, the 
type of analysis carried out and hence generalisability of the results. The final sample 
includes four companies from banking sector, five companies from oil and gas 
exploration sector, four companies from utilities sector and one each from cement and 
airline sectors.
4.1.2 Collecting data to measure operating performance
Accounting ratios were used to measure operating performance of each newly 
privatised company. Four accounting measures were used to measure post
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privatisation operating performance. These measures are profitability, operating 
efficiency, leverage and dividend pay out (Megginson et al, 1994).
To measure profitability after privatisation for each company data was collected about 
the net profits (profit after tax), sales, capital employed and equity. These figures were 
used to calculate three accounting ratios to measure profitability. Data for each of 
these measures was collected over a four year period i.e. the year in which 
privatisation was carried out and three years after privatisation. All these accounting 
figures were extracted electronically from the financial reports of each company.
4.1.3 Collecting data to measure financial performance
As stated earlier financial performance after privatisation was measured using the 
methodology adopted by (Choi and Nam, 2006). Existing literature shows that 
investors in newly privatised firms earn positive buy and hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR) over the long-run after privatisation. In this study BHAR to investors of 
newly privatised firms was studied over a three year period after privatisation. Daily 
stock returns were calculated for each company based on closing price of the first day 
of trading after privatisation. These daily returns were used to calculate monthly 
returns, and then these monthly returns were compared with the market return to 
calculate abnormal returns. Data for these daily returns was extracted electronically 
from the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) website.
4.2 Analysing data
This section will describe methods used for analysing the post privatisation operating 
and financial performance of newly privatised firms.
26
MRes Dissertation
4.2.1 Analysing operating performance
Vertical analysis is used to analyse the post privatisation operating performance of 
newly privatised firms. The operating performance of newly privatised firms is 
measured over a four year period starting from the year in which privatisation was 
carried out for each company. And then the trend of operating performance is 
analysed for the next three years to see whether or not privatisation has affected post 
privatisation operating performance of newly privatised firms.
As mentioned earlier four proxies are used to measure operating performance of 
newly privatised firms included in the sample, these proxies are, profitability, 
operating efficiency, leverage and dividend pay out. The results for each of these 
ratios will be analysed in the next section.
4.2.1.1 Net profit Margin
Net profit margin is the first measure used to measure profitability. It is one of the 
most important and commonly used proxies to measure profitability. For the purpose 
of this analysis net profit margin is calculated by dividing profit after tax by total sales 
(Megginson et al, 1994). Net profit margin is calculated for each newly privatised 
company included in the sample for four years including the year of privatisation. The 
year of privatisation is considered as the first year and as a benchmark. The net profit 
margin for each of the next three years after privatisation is compared to the ratio of 
the first year’s net profit margin. The trend in the net profit margin is analysed to see 
whether it has changed after privatisation or not. Table 4.1 describes the four year 




Table 4.1 Net Profit Margin Ratios
Company name NPM1 (%) NPM2 (%) NPM3 (%) NPM4 (%)
UBL -4.23 21.25 56.10 46.22
BANK ALFALAH 8.50 28.62 15.22 8.89
HABIB BANK 26.43 16.43 24.28 19.17
NBP 3.21 21.38 29.53 30.59
POF 32.83 36.78 37.10 41.54
ATTOCK REFINERY 1.21 1.50 2.67 2.13
DG Khan Cement 10.12 15.85 31.86 30.40_____
OGDCL 44.71 43.45 49.45 53.04
SSGC 2.22 1.92 1.34 0.42
PIA 3.99 -6.89 -16.26 -19.01
PPL 37.46 37.02 42.20 43.69
KAPCO 29.20 16.19 13.46 14.24
NRL 4.94 3.49 4.60 4.64
KESC 1.73 -17.08 -27.14 -32.27
PTCL 32.46 27.11 23.96 -4.62
In table 4.1 company name indicates names of the companies included in the sample. 
NPM1 shows the percentage of net profit margin in year 1, which is the year of 
privatisation, while NPM2, NPM3 and NPM4 show the net profit margin percentages 
for the following three years after the year of privatisation.
Table 4.1 shows that net profit margin ratio for eight newly privatised companies 
(53% of the sample) improved when compared to the net profit margin in the year of 
privatisation. Seven firms (47% of the sample) show a decrease in their net profit 
margin when compared to the net profit margin in the year of privatisation. These 
results will be discussed in detail in the interpretation and findings section.
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4.2.1.2 Return on Capital Employed
Return on capital employed is another proxy used to measure profitability of newly 
privatised companies included in the sample. For the purpose of this analysis return 
on capital employed ( ROCE) is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest and 
tax to the sum of book value of debt and book value of equity (Damodaran, 2002). 
ROCE is one of the most widely used measures of profitability, as it is a good 
indicator of operating profitability of a firm. Because it takes in to account only the 
operating profits i.e. profits before interest and tax expenses.
Book value of debt and equity are measured at the beginning of each accounting 
period (Damodaran, 2002). Table 4.2 describes the four year trend in ROCE for each 
privatised company included in the sample.
Table 4.2 shows the return on capital employed (ROCE) for all fifteen companies 
included in the sample over a four year period including the year of privatisation. 
ROCE1 shows the percentage of return on capital employed in the year of 
privatisation, while ROCE2, ROCE3 and ROCE4 are the percentages of return on 
capital employed in the following three years after privatisation.
Table 4.2 shows that ROCE for seven firms (47% of the sample) increased over the 
following three years after privatisation. Four companies (27 % of the sample) show a 
decrease in their ROCE, while the rest of the sample firms give mixed results over the 




Table 4.2 Return on Capital Employed Ratios (ROCE)
Company Name ROCE1 (%) ROCE2 (%) ROCE3 (%) ROCE4 (%)
UBL 24.67 31.16 53.66 43.76
BANK ALFALAH 55.57 109.75 39.68 43.70
HABIB BANK 55.50 3.15 41.94 43.76
NBP 75.03 47.46 52.70 49.57
POF 37.41 40.39 45.63 43.91
ATTOCK REFINERY 18.49 22.94 47.20 23.05
DG Khan Cement 22.04 14.95 25.74 20.29........ ......
OGDCL 37.22 40.06 54.28 64.78
SSGC 24.26 20.82 30.64 31.97
PIA 22.33 -16.52 -40.07 -49.86
PPL 63.15 63.38 66.91 60.74
KAPCO 44.39 49.96 47.66 48.14
NRL 46.42 47.37 47.99 58.34
KESC -27.98 -48.06 -48.04 -20.44
PTCL 41.54 32.37 21.87 -3.69
4.2.1.3 Return on Equity
Return on equity (ROE) is the third and final proxy used to measure profitability of 
the sample firms included in this analysis. For the purpose of this analysis ROE is 
calculated as the ratio of profit after tax to equity. Profit after taxes in the calculation 
of this ratio are the profits after dividends to preferred share holders being paid, while 
preferred shares are not included in the calculation of the book value of equity. 
Preferred shareholders have different type of claims i.e. preferred shares poses 
qualities of both debt and equity that is why they are excluded from the book value of
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common equity (Damodaran, 2002). Table 4.3 shows the results for ROE ratio (in 
percentage) over the four year period of the fifteen firms included in the sample.
Table 4.3 Return on Equity Ratios (ROE)
Company Name ROE1 (%) ROE2 (%) ROE3 (%) ROE4 (%)
UBL -9.01 36.90 100.00 179.88
BANKALFALAH 44.57 106.16 43.52 43.08
HABIB BANK 14.67 7.84 65.80 67.38
NBP 6.34 126.78 215.09 243.17
POF 237.14 297.19 189.87 287.30
ATTOCK REFINERY 97.67 134.42 331.41 262.23
DG Khan Cement 18.37 28.85 91.22 131.16
OGDCL 193.90 53.15 76.58 106.50
SSGC 14.85 15.09 13.29 4.33
PIA 13.95 -24.54 -63.81 -64.18
PPL 96.49 125.73 195.40 244.49
KAPCO 91.43 60.41 56.70 90.50
NRL 37.65 318.21 630.66 750.99
KESC 1.45 -15.61 -26.42 -34.87
PTCL 53.51 44.12 30.66 -5.54
Table 4.3 shows that ROE has increased for nine firms (60% of the sample) in the 
following three years after privatisation when compared to the ROE in the year of 
privatisation. ROE of six firms (40 % of the sample) has decreased in the following 
three years after privatisation. These results are very important to answer the research 
questions regarding the impact of privatisation on firm’s operating performance and 




Operating efficiency for the sample firms is measured using the accounting ratio of 
total assets turnover (ATO). The ratio is calculated by dividing total sales by total 
assets. This ratio is different from the one used by Megginson et al (1994) to measure 
post privatisation operating efficiency of newly privatised firms. Megginson et al 
(1994) used the ratio of sale efficiency (real sales/employees), but due to the 
unavailability of data on the number of employees for the sample firms this ratio 
could not be used to measure operating efficiency of the sample firms. Instead total 
assets turnover ratio is used to measure operating efficiency. Bodie et al (2004) states 
that total asset turnover could also be used as an indicator of operating efficiency of a 
company, as it measures the efficiency of a company’s use of its assets in generating 
sales.
Table 4.4 shows asset turnover ratio results for sample firms over a four year period 
starting from the year of privatisation.
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Table 4.4 Asset Turnover Ration (ATO)
Company Name ATOl ATG2 AT03 AT04
UBL 6.02 4.15 3.39 5.81
BANK ALFALAII 8.05 7.50 4.62 5.85
HABIB BANK 0.99 0.68 1.12 15.66
NBP 8.27 6.23 7.83 9.76
POF 66.71 60.00 62.64 57.38
ATTOCK REFINERY 11.88 14.29 25.85 38.24
DG Khan Cement 31.72 31.58 45.07 44.16
OGDCL 54.91 54.84 54.02 66.84
SSGC 20.71 21.17 30.54 11.15
PIA 73.45 87.90 66.03 59.34
PPL 74.31 73.27 77.33 76.20
KAPCO 75.04 95.79 95.26 98.21
NRL 22.17 32.95 27.97 27.76
KESC 63.09 64.20 58.02 53.51
PTCL 18.09 15.38 42.71 43.60
Table 4.4 shows that how well the sample firms have used their assets in generating 
sales revenues. Asset turnover ratio (ATO) of nine firms (60% of the sample) 
improved after privatisation, while the ratio has decreased for six firms (40% of the 
sample). For example for UBL Table 4.4 (row 1) show that, ATO ratio decreased 
from (6.02 times) in the year of privatisation to (4.15 times) in the first year after 




For the purpose of this analysis leverage of sample firms is measured by debt to 
equity ratio (Megginson et al, 1994). This ratio is calculated by dividing the long term 
debt of a company by the book value of its equity, and it shows the percentage of debt 
as a proportion of shareholders equity (Damodaran, 2002). Table 4.5 shows the 
percentages of debt to equity (DTE) ratio for all of the fifteen newly privatised firms 
included in the study.
Table 4.5 Debt to Equity Ratios (DTE)
Company Name DTE1 (%) DTE2 (%) DTE3 %) DTE4 (%)
UBL 18.22 30.41 110.14 119.78
BANK ALFALAH 238.28 150.49 120.05 190.12
HABIB BANK 205.25 210.00 692.81 592.48
NBP 131.39 483.94 388.11 415.39
POF 143.30 291.60 188.90 223.95
ATTOCK REFINERY 813.18 806.83 707.88 646.95
DG Khan Cement 238.01 181.85 156.33 276.89
OGDCL 120.96 36.22 45.63 38.72
SSGC 0.17 216.40 255.81 339.71
PIA 279.77 229.21 337.52 371.95
PPL 50.00 48.54 37.11 37.27
KAPCO 129.11 127.97 119.71 31.01
NRL 3.72 37.06 35.56 39.05
KESC 29.03 35.38 44.62 71.49
PTCL 47.77 59.66 34.24 34.60
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Table 4.5 shows that debt to equity ratios (DTE) of seven firms (47% of the sample) 
decreased over the four year period when compared to the year of privatisation, while 
debt to equity ratio of eight firms (53% of the sample) increased over the four years in 
comparison to the first year (the year of privatisation).
4.2.1.6 Pay out measure
Dividend pay out ratio (DPO) is used to measure the pay out to shareholders of newly 
privatised firms included in the sample. For the purpose of this analysis dividend pay 
out is calculated by dividing total dividends by profit after tax (net profits). 
Megginson et al (1994) amongst others argue that pay out ratio increases after 
privatisation for newly privatised firms, Table 4.6 below show results of pay out 
ratios for all of the fifteen firms included in the sample.
DPOl is the dividend pay out in the year of privatisation DP02, DP03 and DP04 are 
the dividend pay out ratios for year 1, year 2 and year 3 respectively after 
privatisation. Table 4.6 shows that dividend pay out ratio (DPO) for seven companies 
(47% of the sample) increased over the four year period after privatisation, while 
seven firms (47 % of the sample) show a decrease in their DPO over the four year 
period after privatisation. Similarly Table 4.6 also shows that dividend pay out for one 
firm is unchanged after privatisation. These results will be discussed in detail in the 
interpretation and findings section.
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Table 4.6 Dividend Pay out Ratios (DPO)
Company Name DPOl (%) DP02 (%) DP03 (%) D P04 (%)
UBL 0 60.97 22.50 8.34
BANK ALFALAH 56.09 23.55 45.96 27.86
HABIB BANK 0 0 27.13 39.02
NBP 40.56 11.85 11.62 8.57
POF 68.00 25.24 65.84 43.51
ATTOCK REFINERY 0 0 53.05 0
DG Khan Cement 0 0 14.95 11.44
OGDCL 47.96 62.93 78.35 75.12
SSGC 101.01 99.43 112.90 298.48
PIA 17.33 0.12 0 0
PPL 46.64 39.77 33.27 0
KAPCO 100 140.71 124.58 68.85
NRL 35.72 46.92 19.76 22.09
KESC 0 0 0 0
PTCL 130.13 43.03 102.07 0
4.2.2 Analysing Financial Performance
This section of the chapter will describe how financial performance of newly 
privatised firms included in the sample was analysed. Event study methodology, buy 
and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) adopted from (Choi and Nam, 2006) is used in 
this study to measure the financial performance of newly privatised firms.
To calculate BHAR returns for this analysis, first monthly buy-and-hold returns 
(BHR) were calculated by compounding daily returns. Daily returns were calculated 
based on the closing price of the first trading date after privatisation. Annual buy-and- 
hold returns (BHR) were calculated. by compounding the monthly buy-and-hold
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returns (BHR). Using this methodology, buy-and-hold returns (BHR) for one, two and 
three year horizon were calculated for shares of each of the fifteen newly privatised 
firms included in the study.
After calculating annual buy-and-hold returns (BHR) for sample firms and market 
index (in this case Karachi Stock Exchange index), one, two and three years buy-and- 
hold abnormal returns (BHAR) were calculated by subtracting the corresponding buy- 
and-hold returns (BHR) of market from the relevant buy-and-hold returns (BHR) of 
our sample firms.
Table 4.7 shows the results for one, two and three year’s buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHAR) for our sample firms.
Table 4.7 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR)
Company Name One Year BHAR Two Years BHAR Three Years BHAR
UBL 1.30 -1.37 -0.85
BANK ALFALAH -1.55 0.07 -0.29
HABIB BANK -0.05 -0.07 -0.02
NBP -1.52 -0.21 0.88
POF -1.34 0.28 0.09
ATTOCK REFINERY -1.26 -0.08 0.65
DG Khan Cement -1.40 -0.08 0.22
OGDCL -1.15 -0.03 -0.10
SSGC -1.46 -0.51 -0.29
PIA -1.22 0.32 -0.79
PPL -1.42 0.05 -0.50
KAPCO -1.50 -0.11 -0.39
NRL -1.24 -0.05 0.06
KESC -1.36 -0.41 -0.09
PTCL -1.21 -0.18 -0.22
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Table 4.7 column 2 shows that one year BHAR of fourteen companies (93% of the 
sample firms) is negative i.e. they have underperformed the market. The two years 
BHAR of 73% sample firms is negative, while the three years BHAR is negative for 
67% firms in the sample. These results are very important to answer the research 
questions regarding the post privatisation financial performance of newly privatised 
firms and will be discussed in detail in the next section.
4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter methods used for collecting and analysing data were discussed in 
detail. The chapter started with how the sample was chosen, and then the different 
sources from which data was extracted were also described. Secondary data sources, 
such as companies’ annual reports and stock exchange data were the main sources of 
data. The analysis part of the chapter was divided in to two sections, in section one 
analysis carried out to measure operating performance of the sample firms were 
presented, while section two described the analysis carried out for financial 
performance measurement. In the final two sections of the chapter results of the 
analysis carried out were also presented in the form of tables.
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5 Interpreting the data
In the last chapter results of different ratios used to measure operating and financial 
performance were presented. In this chapter these results will be interpreted in light of 
the existing literature and research questions. The chapter is divided in to two 
sections; in section one results of operating performance measures while in section 
two results of financial performance measures will be discussed.
5.1 Operating performance results interpretation
Operating performance of the sample firms was measured using the methodology 
adopted by Megginson et al (1994). Four measures were used to measure the 
operating performance. These measures are, profitability, operating efficiency, 
leverage and payout. Each of these measures was calculated using accounting ratios. 
These are the most common measures used to measure post privatisation operating 
performance in the existing literature. Most of the existing literature on privatisation 
shows that operating performance improves after privatisation (see for example, 
Martin and Parker (1995), Megginson et al (1994), D’souza and Megginson (1999), 
Boubakri and Cosset (1998) etc).
To measure post privatisation operating performance most of the studies used the 
methodology adopted by Megginson et al (1994), which has been used in this study as 
well. Most studies mentioned above document a significant increase in profitability, 
operating efficiency and dividend pay out after privatisation, while a significant 
decline in post privatisation leverage ratios.
Based on the results of the existing literature this research asked two questions 
regarding the post privatisation operating performance of newly privatised firms.
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© Has the operating performance of SOEs improved in the three years following 
privatisation in Pakistan?
© Is there any difference in the post privatisation operating performance of 
newly privatised firms that were privatised through direct sale and share issue 
privatisation (SIP)?
The following accounting ratios were used to measure the post privatisation operating 
performance, net profit margin (NPM), return on capital employed (ROCE), return on 
equity (ROCE), total assets turnover (ATO), debt to equity (DTE) and dividend pay 
out (DPO). The results for each of these ratios will be interpreted in the next section 
to see how it answers the research questions.
5.1.1 Net profit Margin
Results of the net profit margin ratio (NPM) for the sample firms are presented in the 
figure 5.1 below. In figure 5.1 the X-axis shows names of the companies included in 
the sample, Y-axis shows the percentage value of net profit margin for each firm in 
the four years period starting with the year of privatisation. NPM1 represents the net 
profit margins in the year of privatisation, while NPM2, NPM3 and NPM4 are the net 
profit margins for the following three years after privatisation. Figure 5.1 shows that 
NPM of eight firms in the sample improved when compared to the year of 










_40 00 ---------- -^--------------------------------------------- :--------------------- ~ ----— ------------   ■ ■ - - — ■------------------------------------- 1
Company Name
Based on the results of the existing studied (Such as, Megginson et al (1994), Sun and 
Tong (2002), Gupta (2005) etc) one would expect the NPM for all of the fifteen firms 
to increase after privatisation. But seven firms have shown a decline in the NPM after 
the year of privatisation. One thing which is common between these seven firms for 
which the NPM has declined after privatisation is that, six of them were privatised 
after the year 2004 (See Appendix 1). On the other hand the sample firms for which 
the NPM has increased after privatisation were all privatised before the year 2004. So 
it can be argued that the period of privatisation has affected post privatisation 
performance of newly privatised firms included in the sample.
Similarly NPM for 67% of the firms privatised through IPO has increased after 
privatisation, while NPM for 67% of the firms privatised through asset sale has 
decreased after privatisation (See Appendix 1). This is a very important indicator to 
answer the research question regarding the affects of the method of privatisation on 
post privatisation operating performance of firms.
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5.1.2 Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)
Results for ROCE are mixed for the sample firms as shown in figure 5.2. ROCE for 
47% of the sample firms improved in the three year period after privatisation in 
comparison to ROCE in the year of privatisation. ROCE for 27% of the sample firms 
decreased in the following three years after privatisation; while ROCE for 26% firms 
has shown a mixed trend in the following three years after privatisation (i.e. increased 
in some years after privatisation while decreased in others).
Figure: 5.2
Figure 5.2: Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)
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Again from Appendix lit seems that the period of privatisation has played some part 
in the post privatisation value of ROCE for sample firms, because ROCE results of 
only those sample firms that were privatised prior to the year 2004 are consistent with 
findings of the existing studies.
As far as affects of the method of privatisation on ROCE are concerned results are 
mixed, because ROCE for 55% of the firms privatised through IPO has increased in 
the following years after privatisation. ROCE for only 22% of the firms privatised 
through IPO has decreased and for 23% firms it is mixed. On the other hand ROCE
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for 67% of the firms privatised through asset sale has either decreased or is mixed and 
for the rest of 33% it has decreased in the following years after privatisation.
5.1.3 Return on Equity (ROE)
Figure 5.3 shows that ROE for 60% of the sample firms increased in the following 
three years after privatisation, while ROE for the rest of 40% sample firms decreased 
after privatisation. The decrease in ROE of 40% firms in the sample contradict results 
of most of the existing studies on privatisation, but again the noticeable fact is that the 
sample firms for which ROE has decreased in the following three years after 
privatisation were privatised after 2004 (See Appendix 1).
Appendix 1 also shows that 56% of the firms privatised through IPO are amongst 
those firms for which ROE has increased, while 67% of the firms privatised through 
asset sale have shown an increase in their ROE in the following three years after 
privatisation. This shows that the affects of the method of privatisation on post 
privatisation values of firms’ ROE are not very clear.
Figure: 5.3
Figure 5.3: Return On Equity (ROE)
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5.1.4 Total Asset Turnover (ATO)
Figure 5.4 shows the asset turnover ratio (ATO) results for the sample firms. This 
ratio is used as a measure of the operating efficiency of newly privatised firms 
included in the sample. Again results of the ATO ratio in figure 5.4 partially support 
findings of the previous studies i.e. ATO ratio for 60% of the sample firms increased 
in the following years after privatisation, while ATO ratio for 40% firms decreased in 
the following years after privatisation. Amongst the 40% firms ATO ratio for half of 
the firms has increased immediately after privatisation (e.g. SSGC, POF and PIA, 
figure 5.4) but decreased afterwards.
Figure: 5.4
Figure 5.4: Total Asset Turnover (ATO)
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Also Appendix 1 shows that most (67%) of the firms in figure 5.4 showing an 
increase in post privatisation ATO ratio were privatised through PO , while the rest 
33% of firms were privatised through asset sale. Based on these results it can be 
argued that the method of privatisation does have an impact on the post privatisation 




Leverage of the sample firms was measured by debt to equity ratio (DTE). Figure 5.5 
shows results of the debt to equity ratio. Previous studies on privatisation shows that 
leverage of newly privatised firms decline significantly after privatisation (see for 
example, Megginson and Netter (2001). But figure 5.5 shows that DTE of only 47% 
of the sample firms decreased after privatisation which is consistent with the findings 
of previous studies, while DTE of 53% firms increased after privatisation which 
contradict most of previous studies’ findings.
As far as the relationship between method of privatisation and post privatisation 
leverage is concerned, Appendix 1 shows that 56% of the firms privatised through 
IPO have seen a decrease in their post privatisation DTE ratio. On the other hand DTE 
ratio of only 33% of the firms privatised through asset sale has decreased in the 
following three years after privatisation. Again this indicates that firms privatised 
through different methods some how perform differently after privatisation.
Figure: 5.5





















5.1.6 Dividend Pay Out (DPO)
Figure 5.6 show results of dividend pay out ratio (DPO) for sample firms. Again 
results for the sample firms partially support findings of previous studies i.e. DPO 
ratio has increased for 53% of the sample firms.
Figure: 5.6
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Similarly DPO ratio of 56% of firms privatised through IPO has increased in the 
subsequent years after privatisation, while DPO ratio of only 33% of firms privatised 
through asset sale has increased in the subsequent years after privatisation. Therefore 
this indicates a possible relationship between the method of privatisation and post 
privatisation operating performance.
5.2 Financial Performance results interpretation
Post privatisation financial performance of the sample firms was measured using the 
methodology adopted by Choi and Nam (2006). Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 




Most of the existing literature on post privatisation financial performance of newly 
privatised firms show that investors in newly privatised firms earn positive long run 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (see for example, Levis (1993), Jelic and Briston 
(1999), Megginson et al (2000) etc). In contrast to the studies mentioned above 
Omran (2005) shows that investors in newly privatised firms earn positive abnormal 
returns in the first year, while over a three-year and five-year period these abnormal 
returns are negative.
In the existing literature the phenomena of long run buy-and-hold returns has only 
been studied for those firms that were privatised through share issues (SIP), while in 
this study the buy-and-hold abnormal returns were calculated for both type of 
privatised firms i.e. firms that were privatised through share issue as well as through 
asset sale. Therefore the research questions regarding the long run financial 
performance of newly privatised firms were,
® What are the stock returns to investors of newly privatised firms over the long- 
run (3-years) after privatisation, for firms that were privatised through direct 
sale and SIP?
® Is there any difference in the stock returns of firms privatised through direct 
sale and SIP?
Figure 5.7 show results for BHAR and Figure 5.8 shows buy-and-hold returns (BHR) 
for the sample firms over the three years horizon. The contrasting trend of the results 




Figure 5.7: Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR)
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Figure 5.7: One year BHAR are negative for 93% firms, two years BHAR are negative for 73%, while three years 
BHAR are negative for 67%.
Results for BHR and BHAR in Figure: 5.7 and Figure: 5.8 shows that investors in 
newly privatised firms earn positive buy-and-hold returns (BHR) over three years, but 
are underperformed by the domestic market i.e. BHAR are negative for most of the 





Figure 5.8: Buy-and-hold Returns (BHR)
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Figure 5.8: One year BHR are negative for only 20% of the sample firms, while two years and three years BHR are 
positive for all firms in the sample.
These results are partially consistent with the findings of Omran (2005), because 
Omran (2005) also document negative BHAR for three years horizon after the one 
year positive returns.
These results partially contradicts findings of Choi and Nam (2006) when compared 
to the results for the whole sample they used, but support Choi and Nam’s (2006) 
findings when compared to the subsamples they used. Choi and Nam (2006) divided 
their sample in to three categories i.e. low income countries, middle income countries 
and high income countries. After dividing the sample in to three categories based on 
the national income for each country, Choi and Nam (2006) found that BHAR returns 
are negative over a three years horizon for low income countries. So considering the 
economic conditions of Pakistan and treating it as a low income country it can be 




As far as the affects of method of privatisation on post privatisation financial 
performance is concerned , the results in Figure: 5.7 and Figure: 5.8 shows that the 
method of privatisation does not affect the post privatisation BHAR or BHR for 





In the previous chapter results of operating and financial performance were 
interpreted in light of the existing literature and research questions of the study. This 
chapter will present main findings of the study. In the first section main findings in 
relation to operating performance as well as financial performance will be presented 
and in section two limitations of the research will be discussed.
6.1 Findings reiated to post privatisation operating 
performance
Major findings regarding post privatisation operating performance are summarised in 
the table 6.1 below.
Table 6.1: The percentage of sample firms showing increase in each of the accounting ratios 
after privatisation, and the percentage of IPO firms and Asset sale firms showing increase in 
each ratio.
Ratios
% of the sample firms 
showing increase in each 
ratio.
% of IPO Firms 
showing increase 
in each ratio.
% of Asset Sale Firms 
showing increase in each 
ratio.
NPM 53 67 33
ROCE 53 67 33
ROE 60 56 67
ATO 60 67 50
DE 47 56 33
DPO 53 56 33
Table 6.1 (column 2) shows that post privatisation operating performance in terms of, 
profitability, efficiency, leverage and dividend pay out improved for more than half of
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the sample firms, therefore partially supporting the findings of (Megginson et al 
(1994), Boubakri and Cosset (1998), D’souza and Megginson (1999), Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001)).
Table 6.1 (column 3) shows that post privatisation operating performance improved 
for more firms privatised through IPO as compared to firms privatised through asset 
sale. This implies that the method of privatisation does have an affect on post 
privatisation operating performance, which was one of the research questions for this 
study.
Sample firms privatised before the year 2004 showed greater increase in operating 
performance as compared to the sample firms which were privatised after the year 
2004. This finding seems to be consistent with the argument put forward by (Boubakri 
et al (2005) and D’souza et al (2005)). (Boubakri et al (2005) and D’souza et al 
(2005)) argue that post privatisation operating performance improvement is dependent 
on many factors such as, economic growth, macro economic reforms and corporate 
governance structures in a country as well as firms’ specific factors. It can be argued 
that the overall business environment in Pakistan after the year 2004 might have 
affected the post privatisation operating performance of the sample firms.
Table 6.1 (columnl) also shows that post privatisation, Profitability, efficiency and 
payout decreased for more than 40% of the sample firms, while leverage for more 
than 40% of the sample firms actually increased after privatisation. These findings are 
consistent with the findings of previous studies (such as, Boardman and vining 
(1989), Martin and Parker (1995), Harper (2001), (Zuobao et al (2003)).
Appendix 1 shows the percentage sold by the government in each company. The 
percentage of control relinquished by government does not have a consistent impact 
on post privatisation performance of the sample firms, but it does affect the post
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privatisation operating performance in some cases i.e. firms in which the government 
has retained controlling interest performed poorly after privatisation in some cases, 
while in some cases firms in which government has retained controlling interest 
performed well. Therefore this finding is partially consistent with Boubakri et al 
(2005). Boubakri et al (2005) argue that the percentage of control relinquished affect 
post privatisation operating performance, which is the case for some of the firms in 
the sample.
6.2 Findings related to post privatisation financial 
performance
Main findings in relation to post privatisation financial performance are summarised 
in table 6.2.
Table 6.2 shows that the mean one year BHR for sample firms are 12% while the 
mean one year BHAR are -109%. This means that sample firms have underperformed 
the domestic market in year one, and the same trend is persistent for two years and 
three years BHAR. Although the margin of underperformance is relatively small-15% 
(year two) and -10% (year three), when compared to -109% BHAR in year one.
53
MRes Dissertation_____________________________________ —  w
Table 6.2: Mean and Median returns (BHR and BHAR) for sample firms over a three years 
horizon. All these results are significant at 5%.
BHR One Year Two Years Three Years
Mean 0.12 1.23 1.13
Median 0.04 1.28 0.97
BHAR One Year Two Years Three Years
Mean -1.09 -0.15 -0.10
Median -1.33 -0.07 -0.09
These findings are consistent with the findings of Aggarwal et al (1993) who 
documents one year market-adjusted returns for privatisation initial public offerings 
averaging -29.9%. But contradicts (Boardman and Laurin (2000), Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001)) who documents significantly positive long-term (1-5 years) 
abnormal returns for privatisation IPOs.
The results in table 6.2 also shows that the method of privatisation does not affect post 
privatisation BHAR and BHR, as the trend of BHAR and BHR is the same for firms 
privatised through share issue and asset sale.
6.3 Limitations of the study
One limitation of the study is small sample size. The sample size is small which 
decreases the external validity and generalisability of the results. Due to the 
unavailability of data for all of the privatisation transactions carried out in Pakistan, 
only fifteen companies out of the total of 167 privatised companies were studied in
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this research. Due to this limitation results of the study could not be generalised to the 
whole population of newly privatised firms in Pakistan.
Another limitation of the research is that, pre privatisation accounting and financial 
data was not available for majority of the sample firms, due to which analysis was 
restricted to only post privatisation years. The analysis would have been more 
rigorous, more valid and more credible if post privatisation performance could have 
been compared with three to five years pre privatisation performance.
Another limitation of the study is that, only those firms were included in the sample 
which had their accounting and financial data available online. This limitation leads to 
the sample selection bias due to which the sample could not be considered to 
represent the whole population of newly privatised firms in Pakistan.
Apart from these limitations mentioned above another limitation of the study arise 
from the use of accounting data to measure post privatisation performance. The use of 
accounting measures could be considered as a threat to validity and reliability of the 
study. One of the inherent limitations of the accounting data is that it can easily be 
distorted by using creative accounting techniques, so the financial statements could 
provide a misleading picture of the performance to shareholders. Therefore, using 
accounting data as measures of performance could decrease validity of the results 
based on these measures.
Our sample includes companies from different sectors, such as financial, 
manufacturing and services industries. The same set of accounting measures have 
been used to measure the post privatisation performance for all companies from 
different sectors, which could affect the validity and reliability of the results. Because, 
firms operating in different sectors have different capital structures, which would 
affect the outlook of its financial statements and the ratios based on those statements.
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For example using the same set of performance measures for banks and 
manufacturing firms could be misleading, as banks would have significantly high 
leverage and high interest expenses as opposed to a manufacturing firm which would 
have a large proportion of its equity financed by shareholders. Therefore comparing 
the operating performance of banks with manufacturing sector using the same set of 
measures would provide misleading results. All these inherent limitations of the data 




This study investigated the post privatisation operating and financial performance of 
newly privatised firms in Pakistan. Two most predominant methodologies used in the 
existing literature for measuring post privatisation operating and financial 
performance were adopted in this study to analyse post privatisation operating and 
financial performance of the sample firms. For measuring post privatisation operating 
performance accounting ratios adopted from Megginson et al (1994) were used, while 
financial performance was measured by using BHAR and BHR adopted from Choi 
and Nam, (2006).
The main findings regarding the post privatisation operating performance are that, 
post privatisation operating performance for only (50- 60%) of the sample firms 
improved, while for more than 40% firms post privatisation operating performance 
decreased. It is argued that the decline in post privatisation operating performance for 
sample firms may have been caused by the broader economic and political 
environment of the country. There was also some evidence that the post privatisation 
operating performance is affected by methods used to privatise a firm (i.e. SIP or asset 
sale), while there was also some inconsistent evidence indicating a possible 
association between control relinquished by government and post privatisation 
operating performance.
Main findings regarding post privatisation financial performance were that the BHAR 
are negative over a three years horizon and newly privatised sample firms 
underperformed the domestic market. This underperformance was economically and 
statistically significant. While there was no evidence to suggest that the post 
privatisation financial performance is affected by methods used to privatise a state
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owned enterprise. These findings regarding post privatisation financial performance 
seems to contradict most of the existing studies.
In the end limitations of the research were also discussed. There are broadly two 
types of limitations of the study, one arising from the small sample size and the nature 
of data used. The second limitation of the study arises from using accounting data as 
measures of economic performance. Both these limitations have affected the validity, 
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Appendix 1: Appendix shows the year of privatisation, percentage sold and the 
method of privatisation used to privatise, for each of the sample firms.
Privatisation
Transaction
Type o f Transaction Date o f Privatisation Percentage 
sold (%)
UBL Asset Sale October 2002 51
UBL IPO August 2005 4.2
BANK ALFALAH Asset Sale December 2002 30
HABIB BANK Asset Sale December 2003 51
NBP IPO February 2002 10
NBP SPO November 2002 10
POF IPO October 2002 100
ATTOCK REFINERY IPO January 2003 100
DG Khan Cement IPO December 2002 100
OGDCL IPO November 2003 5
OGDCL SPO November 2006 9.5
OGDCL SPO April 2007 0.5
SSGC IPO February 2004 5
PIA IPO June .2004 4.01
PIA SPO July 2004 5.8
PPL IPO July 2004 15
KAPCO IPO August 2005 20
NRL Asset Sale May 2005 51
KESC Asset Sale November2005 73
PTCL Asset Sale August 2005 26
Source: Privatisation Commission of Pakistan.
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